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318 Anatomy of Spying 
Whittaker Chambers, like Juliet Poyntz, had joined the party 
in the mid-twenties, and had been taken into espionage work 
by the G.13. He had first worked on the Daily ~orker staff, and 
was then editor of the New Masses. He joined the underground 
in 1932, and two years later was given the task of reorganizing 
certain Communist apparatus members, employed in government 
positions in Washington, into a new apparatus. Among his con-
tacts, he later stated, were Harry Dexter White, assistant to the 
Secretary of the Treasury; Abraham George Silverman of the 
Railroad Retirement Board; Dr. Gregory Silvermaster of the De-
partment of Agriculture; and Alger Hiss of the State Department. 
As another part of his activities Chambers later told of forming 
with two others, John Sherman and Max Lieber, the American 
Feature Writers Syndicate. The real purpose of the Syndicate, 
Chambers later testified, was to provide legal "cover" for certain 
Soviet underground operations overseas. 
By the time he finally broke with the Communist Party, as he 
later wrote, Chambers "was the contact man between a powerful 
Soviet espionage apparatus in Washington and my superior in 
New York City." Though Chambers did not then know him by 
that name, his superior was "Colonel Boris Bykov, a Russian 
officer of the Fourth Section ( military intelligence) of the Red 
Army." 
Chambers "saw the light" in 1938, and could not make up his 
mind which course to take. He went into hiding for a year to 
think the matter over, and then decided on a compromise. He 
went to Washington to try to see President Roosevelt, but the 
highest he got was to Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of 
State, who was in charge of security. Chambers did not reveal 
the full story to Berle. He stressed the Communist connections 
and sympathies of certain officials, but said nothing about their 
being used by Soviet espionage. Nor did he name HaITy Dexter 
\Vl1ite and Silverman, who were among the most important and 
active. 
Roosevelt was not impressed, chiefly because the men Cham-
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hers named· were highly regarded in their departments and had 
excellent records in the government service. So no action was 
taken. 
Two years later Chambers made another attempt. This time 
he saw the F.B.I. but again held back the full story, and again 
no action was taken. In fact, ten years were to pass from Cham-
bers's leaving the G.B.'s employ before he finally plucked up 
courage and came out with every detail. Many of the men he 
named were still members of the administration and still Soviet 
contacts, and the results of Chambers's revelations led to one of 
the most sensational espionage causes celebres of all time. 
During the war, Soviet espionage activity in the United States 
was stepped up, as indeed it was everywhere else. The relation-
ship between the American and the Soviet governments, on the 
American side at all events, was one of allies fighting the same 
evil. In the American view such a relationship included the 
exchange of information, and they took the initiative to try to 
effect this. It was taken so far that in December 1943 General 
William J. Donovan, director of the Office of Strategic Services, 
went to Moscow to discuss a proposal for liaison and co-operation 
between the O.S.S. and Soviet military intelligence. Fortunately, 
before the project was finalized it occurred to the Americans that 
the establishment of a Russian mission in Washington for the 
purposes of liaison and co-operation in intelligence would be 
tantamount to encouraging the establishment of a Soviet espio-
nage agency in the United States at the express invitation of 
the U.S. government, and President Roosevelt canceled the plan. 
The Russians accepted the cancelation quite docilely. They 
could afford to do so, for their penetration of the U.S. adminis-
tration at this time was formidable. 
The official attitude toward the activities of Soviet espionage 
agencies, which Whittaker Chambers had experienced in 1938 
and 1940, was maintained throughout the war. It seems to have 
stemmed from the very top, perhaps because Roosevelt, who 
, believed implicitly in his ability to 'bandle Stalin: was unwill-
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